NDLI: Uncoupled potentials for proportional allocation markets

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Nadav, U. Johari, R. Roughgarden, T.
Copyright Year	2011
Description	Author affiliation: Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA (Johari, R.) \|\| Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA (Nadav, U.; Roughgarden, T.)
Abstract	We study resource allocation games where allocations to agents are made in proportion to their bids. We show that the existence of a potential function in the allocation space, and a virtual price function are sufficient for the convergence of better response dynamics to Nash equilibrium. Generally, resource allocation games do not admit a potential in their strategy space, and are not in the class of potential games. However, for many interesting examples, including the Kelly mechanism, the best response functions are “well-behaved” on the allocation space, and consequently a potential in that space exists. We demonstrate how our sufficient condition is satisfied by three classes of market mechanisms. The first is the class of smooth market-clearing mechanisms, where the market is cleared using a single nondiscriminatory price. The second example is the class of simple g-mechanisms where an efficient Nash equilibrium is implemented with price discrimination. Finally we show our results apply to a subset of scalar strategy VCG (SSVCG) mechanisms, that generalizes simple g-mechanisms.
Starting Page	4479
Ending Page	4484
File Size	279318
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781612848006
ISSN	07431546
e-ISBN	9781612848013
e-ISBN	9781612847993
DOI	10.1109/CDC.2011.6160986
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-12-12
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Resource management Games Nash equilibrium Vectors Dynamic scheduling Convergence Aggregates
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Control and Optimization Control and Systems Engineering Modeling and Simulation

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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