NDLI: Optimal bidding strategies with risks for LSEs in competitive electricity markets

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Haoming Liu Xingying Chen Kun Yu Jun Xie Jun Xie Kun Yu Yingchen Liao
Copyright Year	2007
Description	Author affiliation: Coll. of Electr. Eng., Hohai Univ., Nanjing (Haoming Liu; Xingying Chen; Kun Yu Jun Xie; Jun Xie; Kun Yu; Yingchen Liao)
Abstract	In competitive electricity markets which are open for both generation and distribution sides, load serving entities (LSEs) are required to participate in the market competition with risks, since their profits usually reduced because of the shortage of power supply, and their purchasing prices were fluctuant with uncertainties due to the unforeseen bidding. This paper develops the optimal bidding strategies with risks for LSEs to participate in competitive electricity markets, in which stepwise bidding functions and pay-as-bid settlement protocols are utilized. A normal probability distribution function is used to describe the bidding behaviors of rivals, and the issue of constructing optimal bidding strategies for LSEs is formulated as a multi-objective stochastic optimization model, then Monte-Carlo approach is applied to get the corresponding solutions. The proposed bidding strategies have been tested on an electricity market with 3 power companies (Gencos) and 4 LSEs, and relevant analyses have been presented.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	5
File Size	320301
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	142441296X
ISSN	19325517
DOI	10.1109/PES.2007.385909
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2007-06-24
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Electricity supply industry Probability distribution Power generation Power supplies Uncertainty Stochastic processes Optimization methods Protocols Testing Helium Load Serving Entities (LSEs) electricity market bidding strategy bilateral electricity market
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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