NDLI: An Effective Transmission Network Expansion Cost Allocation Based on Game Theory

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Ruiz, P.A. Contreras, J.
Copyright Year	1969
Abstract	The expansion of transmission systems impacts many entities in the market environment. Each entity may fare better or worse as a result of congestion relief in the presence of new investments. Negatively affected firms exert their influence to prevent the expansion from taking place. The opposition of these firms and the lack of appropriate incentives results in insufficient investments in transmission assets. The network is being frequently used at its maximum limits, leading to economic inefficiencies and reduced reliability. Hence, there is a need for effective incentive schemes for network expansion. In this paper, we propose a game theory-based scheme for the allocation of transmission expansion costs among market entities. The allocation takes into account both the physical and economic impacts of the new transmission assets and the influence of each firm on the expansion decision. This is the first scheme designed to give all market participants explicit incentives to support the expansion. The application of the allocation solution to the Garver six-bus system is presented to illustrate the capabilities of the proposed method
Sponsorship	IEEE Power Engineering Society
Starting Page	136
Ending Page	144
Page Count	9
File Size	293261
File Format	PDF
ISSN	08858950
Volume Number	22
Issue Number	1
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2007-02-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Costs Game theory Investments Power generation economics Environmental economics Incentive schemes Computer science education Educational programs Asset management Regulators transmission expansion Cooperative game theory cost allocation investment incentives Shapley value social welfare
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Energy Engineering and Power Technology Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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